Arbeitspapier

On nash equilibria in speculative attack models

Since a fixed exchange rate regime is a fixed price system, there is no theoretical reason to presume that the foreign exchange market clears, particularly during a speculative attack. This paper shows that equilibria where we allow for the possibility of such corner solutions are a superset of the previously examined "market-clearing" equilibria. The timing of the balance-of-payments crisis is no longer predictable in the same sense - multiple equilibria exist even in the very simplest speculative attack model.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: UCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series ; No. WP16/13

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Foreign Exchange
Central Banks and Their Policies

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Pastine, Ivan
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University College Dublin, UCD School of Economics
(wo)
Dublin
(wann)
2016

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Pastine, Ivan
  • University College Dublin, UCD School of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2016

Ähnliche Objekte (12)