Arbeitspapier

IEAs and compliance: Do treaty linkages play a role?

International environmental agreements (IEAs) address cross-border public goods, therefore they are faced with free-riding problems. Generally, the incentives of states to comply with such treaties are low as the benefits of compliance do not always outweigh the cost. Previous literature has pointed towards the importance of the treaty design characteristics in motivating compliance and deterring free-riding. The aim of this paper is to investigate the association of using of those mechanisms -treaty linkages- and the compliance with IEAs. By using data on 92 IEAs from the international regime database (IRD), the paper finds that the number of reinforcing links per treaty has a positive and significant association with better compliance. Counter to existing literature, trade links, however, do not exhibit a significant association with better compliance.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ILE Working Paper Series ; No. 43

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Public Goods
International Law
International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations
Environmental Economics: General
Environment and Development; Environment and Trade; Sustainability; Environmental Accounts and Accounting; Environmental Equity; Population Growth
Thema
International Environmental agreements
Treaty linkages
Compliance
Public goods

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Maamoun, Nada
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics (ILE)
(wo)
Hamburg
(wann)
2021

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Maamoun, Nada
  • University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics (ILE)

Entstanden

  • 2021

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