Arbeitspapier
Rent seeking in sequential group contests
In this paper, a group contest is analyzed, where the groups are allowed to determine their sharing rules either sequentially or simultaneously. It is found that in case the more numerous group determines its sharing rule prior to the smaller group, rent dissipation in the group contest is higher than in an individual contest. However, if the order of moves is endogenized, the smaller group will always act prior to the bigger group. Competition between the groups is in this way weakened and the groups are able to save on expenditures.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 2/2005
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Gürtler, Oliver
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
- (where)
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Bonn
- (when)
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2005
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Gürtler, Oliver
- University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
Time of origin
- 2005
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Unique equilibrium in rent-seeking contests with a continuum of types
On the evolution of preferences and delegation in Tullock rent-seeking contests
Rent seeking in sequential group contests
On interdependent preferences and sequential structures in rent-seeking contests
Reputational concerns in repeated rent-seeking contests
On negatively interdependent preferences in rent-seeking contests
The Incidence of Overdissipation in Rent-Seeking Contests
Rent-seeking Contests under Symmetric and Asymmetric Information
Rent-seeking Contests under Symmetric and Asymmetric Information
Contractual Incentive Provision and Commitment in Rent-Seeking Contests
Coalition formation versus free riding in rent-seeking contests
Behavior in Rent-Seeking Contests: The Role of Beliefs, Bounded Rationality, Envy, and Group Identity
Unique equilibrium in rent-seeking contests with a continuum of types