Arbeitspapier

Complementarities, Coordination, and Culture

We develop a new model of the intergenerational transmission of culture based on the labor market characteristics of different cultural types. Following Borjas (1994,1995) we assume that cultural heterogeneity increases labor productivity due to skill complementarities, however following Jackson and Xing (2014) we also assume that cultural heterogeneity hampers com-munication. We model this as a game in which individuals first engage in uniformly random matching, and then once matched play a coordination game. Other-type matches are thus potentially more productive, but also less likely to coordinate. We show that this set up can replicate many of the seminal results of Bisin and Verdier (2001) without assuming imperfect empathy. This means that we do not face the inherent difficulties that such models involve when making welfare statements. Further, we are able to obtain new results concerning the efficient size of a cultural minority, the effects of tax and welfare programs on the size and welfare of minorities, and the relationship between the intensity of social interaction and size and welfare of a minority. In an extension of the model we introduce “intermediaries” who may either facilitate other-type matching or improve after-match coordination. We then ask which parent population, the minority or majority, the intermediaries arise from and explore their implications for the equilibrium and welfare.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5949

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Sociology of Economics
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Household Behavior: General
Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
Thema
cultural transmission
coordination games
social interaction
minorities
intermediaries
tax and welfare programs

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Ellis, Christopher J.
Thompson, Jon C.
Wu, Jiabin
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2016

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Ellis, Christopher J.
  • Thompson, Jon C.
  • Wu, Jiabin
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2016

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