Arbeitspapier
The political economy of regulatory risk
This paper investigates political uncertainty as a source of regulatory risk. It shows that political parties have incentives to reduce regulatory risk actively: Mutually beneficial pre-electoral agreements that reduce regulatory risk always exist. Agreements that fully eliminate it exist when political divergence is small or electoral uncertainty is appropriately skewed. These results follow from a fluctuation effect of regulatory risk that hurts parties and an output-expansion effect that benefits at most one party. Due to commitment problems, regulatory agencies with some degree of political independence are needed to implement pre-electoral agreements.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2953
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
-
regulation
regulatory risk
political economy
electoral uncertainty
independent regulatory agency
Regulierung
Politische Entscheidung
Risiko
Aufsichtsbehörde
Selbstverwaltung
Public Choice
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Strausz, Roland
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Strausz, Roland
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2010
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
The political economy of regulatory risk
The Political Economy of Regulatory Risk
The Political Economy of Regulatory Risk
The political economy of risk and ideology
Regulatory agencies and regulatory risk
Regulatory agencies and regulatory risk
Populism, Political Risk and the Economy: Lessons from Italy
A whiter shade of pale: On the political economy of regulatory instruments
The political economy of finance and regulatory capture: Evidence from the US Congress
Politically Induced Regulatory Risk and Independent Regulatory Agencies
Constitutional political economy
Irreversible Investments and Regulatory Risk
The political economy of regulatory risk
The Political Economy of Regulatory Risk
The Political Economy of Regulatory Risk
The political economy of risk and ideology
Regulatory agencies and regulatory risk
Regulatory agencies and regulatory risk
Populism, Political Risk and the Economy: Lessons from Italy
A whiter shade of pale: On the political economy of regulatory instruments
The political economy of finance and regulatory capture: Evidence from the US Congress
Politically Induced Regulatory Risk and Independent Regulatory Agencies
Constitutional political economy
Irreversible Investments and Regulatory Risk
The political economy of regulatory risk
The Political Economy of Regulatory Risk
The Political Economy of Regulatory Risk
The political economy of risk and ideology
Regulatory agencies and regulatory risk
Regulatory agencies and regulatory risk
Populism, Political Risk and the Economy: Lessons from Italy
A whiter shade of pale: On the political economy of regulatory instruments
The political economy of finance and regulatory capture: Evidence from the US Congress
Politically Induced Regulatory Risk and Independent Regulatory Agencies
Constitutional political economy