Abolishing Public Guarantees in the Absence of Market Discipline

Arbeitspapier

This paper shows that the abolition of state guarantees to publicly owned banks in Germany resulted in an increase in funding costs at German savings banks. Rather than being the result of increased market discipline, the increase in funding costs is shown to be driven by spillover effects from German Landesbanken who themselves had suffered from the abolition of guarantees and who spread their own cost increase through the public banking network. Higher funding costs and the resulting drop in bank charter values translated into higher risk-taking at German savings bank.

Angaben zum Objekt

• ISBN: 978-3-86788-494-5
• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Ruhr Economic Papers ; No. 437

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages ; Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation ; Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government ; Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises
• Thema: public bail-out guarantees ; savings banks ; Landesbanken ; market discipline ; bank risk-taking ; banking networks

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Körner, Tobias ; Schnabel, Isabel
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI)
• (wo): Essen
• (wann): 2013

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.4419/86788494
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/83672
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ