Arbeitspapier
Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages
Consider an employer who wants her employee to work hard. As is well known from the e.ciency wage literature, the employer must pay the (wealth-constrained) employee a positive rent to provide incentives for exerting unobservable e.ort. Alternatively, the employer could make effort observable by costly workplace surveillance. It is argued that a privacy protection law preventing surveillance may increase the total surplus. While such a law reduces the employer’s profit, this loss can be overcompensated by the employee’s gain, because the employer invests in surveillance not only to implement higher effort, but also to reduce the employee’s rent.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 25/2005
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Labor Law
Labor Standards: Workers' Rights
- Thema
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Privacy protection laws
workplace surveillance
moral hazard
Arbeitsbedingungen
Kontrolle
Arbeitnehmerschutz
Effizienzlohn
Moral Hazard
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Schmitz, Patrick W.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2005
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Schmitz, Patrick W.
- University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
Entstanden
- 2005