School accountability: Incentives or sorting?

Arbeitspapier

We exploit a nested school accountability reform to estimate the causal effect on teacher mobility, sorting, and student achievement. In 2003, lower-secondary schools in Oslo became accountable to the school district authority for student achievement. In 2005, information on school performance in lower secondary education also became public. Using a difference-in-difference-in-difference approach, we find a significant increase in teacher mobility and that almost all non-stayers leave the teaching sector entirely. The impact is larger on high-ability teachers following the second part of the reform. Non-stayers are largely replaced by high-ability teachers, indicating a positive sorting effect. We find a small, positive effect on student achievement after the second part of the reform, thus the mechanism in place seems to be positive teacher sorting rather than teacher incentives.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Discussion Papers ; No. 815

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Analysis of Education ; Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure ; Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: Public Policy
• Thema: school accountability regimes ; design of incentives ; teacher turnover ; teacher quality ; teacher sorting ; student achievement ; difference-in-difference-in-difference

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Gjefsen, Hege Marie ; Gunnes, Trude
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Statistics Norway, Research Department
• (wo): Oslo
• (wann): 2015

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/192797
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ