Aging, Social Security Design, and Capital Accumulation

Arbeitspapier

This paper analyzes the impact of demographic aging on capital accumulation and welfare in economies with unfunded pensions. Using a two-period overlapping generation model with potentially endogenous retirement decisions, it shows that both the type of aging, i.e. declining fertility or increasing longevity, and the type of pension system, i.e. defined contributions or defined benefits, are important in understanding this impact. Results show that when aging is driven by increasing longevity, an unregulated retirement age system leads to a greater improvement in welfare. In contrast, with decreasing fertility, a mandatory retirement system with defined contributions fares better.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5979

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General ; International Policy Coordination and Transmission ; Public Economics: Miscellaneous Issues: General
• Subject: aging ; public finance sustainability ; social security

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Dedry, Antoine ; Onder, Harun ; Pestieau, Pierre
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2016

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/145014
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET