Artikel

Games with adaptation and mitigation

We formulate and study a nonlinear game of n symmetric countries that produce, pollute, and spend part of their revenue on pollution mitigation and environmental adaptation. The optimal emission, adaptation, and mitigation investments are analyzed in both Nash equilibrium and cooperative cases. Modeling assumptions and outcomes are compared to other publications in this fast-developing area of environmental economics. In particular, our analysis implies that: (a) mitigation is more effective than adaptation in a crowded multi-country world; (b) mitigation increases the effectiveness of adaptation; (c) the optimal ratio between mitigation and adaptation investments in the competitive case is larger for more productive countries and is smaller when more countries are involved in the game.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 11 ; Year: 2020 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 1-16 ; Basel: MDPI

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
economic-environmental model
environmental adaptation
Nash equilibrium
pollution mitigation

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Chritonenko, Natalija V.
Hritonenko, Victoria
Jacenko, Jurij P.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
MDPI
(wo)
Basel
(wann)
2020

DOI
doi:10.3390/g11040060
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Chritonenko, Natalija V.
  • Hritonenko, Victoria
  • Jacenko, Jurij P.
  • MDPI

Entstanden

  • 2020

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