Arbeitspapier

R&D in Cleaner Technology and International Trade

We consider a dynamic three-stage game played by two regulator-firm hierarchies to capture the scale and technological effects of opening markets to international trade. Each firm produces one good sold on the market. Firms can invest in R&D in order to lower their fixed emission/output ratio and are regulated with costly public funds. We take the context of sufficiently high market sizes and investment cost parameters. Opening markets to international trade yields more investment in R&D, more production and a lower emission ratio. When the market size is low enough and the investment cost parameter is high enough, pollution in common market is higher than in autarky. International trade reduces the social welfare.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 17.2004

Classification
Wirtschaft
Externalities
Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
Subject
R&D
Cleaner technology
Common market
Social welfare
Umweltbelastung
Umwelttechnik
Industrieforschung
Handelsliberalisierung
Wohlfahrtsanalyse
Zwei-Länder-Modell
Theorie
Nichtkooperatives Spiel

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Youssef, Slim Ben
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(where)
Milano
(when)
2004

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Youssef, Slim Ben
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Time of origin

  • 2004

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