Arbeitspapier

Vertically Integrated Firms' Investments in Electricity Generating Capacities

We compare investments in generating capacities of an integrated monopolist with the aggregate investments of two vertically integrated competing firms. The firms invest in their capacity and fix the retail price while electricity demand is uncertain. The wholesale price is determined in a unit price auction where the firms know the level of demand when they bid their capacities. Total capacities can be larger or smaller with a duopoly than with a monopoly. If the two firms select the Pareto dominant equilibrium, then the retail price is always higher and the social welfare lower in the duopoly case.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working paper ; No. 3-2007

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Boom, Anette
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Department of Economics
(wo)
Frederiksberg
(wann)
2007

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Boom, Anette
  • Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2007

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