Arbeitspapier

International Competition for R&D Investments

Two jurisdictions compete to attract shares of the R&D investment budget of a large multinational enterprise, whose investments potentially confer positive spillovers on national firms. The firm contributes to local welfare by these spillovers (should they materialize), by tax payments and by dividends paid to local investors. The firm has private information both about its efficiency and about spillovers, and in particular whether the latter do exist or not. It is shown that strategic tax competition may lead to overinvestments relative to the first-best allocation, that the excessive investments occur in the country where the positive spillover effects are lowest, and that they are most severe for the least efficient firms.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 316

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
Tax competition
R&D
common agency

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Olsen, Trond
Osmundsen, Petter
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2000

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Olsen, Trond
  • Osmundsen, Petter
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2000

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