Foreign agents? Natural resources & the political economy of civil society

Arbeitspapier

Resource-rich dictatorships are more inclined to repress civil society than others. In this paper, we identify a tradeoff between political rents from natural resources and the organizational density of civil society. This organizational density determines the extent to which citizens can threaten the dictator with a revolution. We find that, in the occurrence of a negative oil price shock, regime change becomes likely, whereas a positive oil shock increases the extractive capacity of the dictator. When a negative oil price shock occurs, the persecution of failed revolutionaries can prevent revolution if the probability of revolutionary success is already low ex-ante. Historical and contemporary illustrations are drawn from Iran, the Soviet Union/Russia and Egypt.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Diskussionsbeiträge ; No. 2016/18

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions: Consumer Economics; Health; Education and Training: Welfare, Income, Wealth, and Poverty ; Other Economic Systems: Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies ; Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems ; Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts
• Thema: natural resources ; dictatorship ; civil society ; organizational density ; persecution

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Breyel, Corinna ; Grigoriadis, Theocharis
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Freie Universität Berlin, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft
• (wo): Berlin
• (wann): 2016

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/146517
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ