Arbeitspapier

Unintended Effects of Anonymous Resumes

We evaluate an experimental program in which the French public employment service anonymized resumes for firms that were hiring. Firms were free to participate or not; participating firms were then randomly assigned to receive either anonymous resumes or name-bearing ones. We find that participating firms become less likely to interview and hire minority candidates when receiving anonymous resumes. We show how these unexpected results can be explained by the self-selection of firms into the program and by the fact that anonymization prevents the attenuation of negative signals when the candidate belongs to a minority.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 8517

Classification
Wirtschaft
Labor Discrimination
Labor Discrimination: Public Policy
Subject
anonymous applications
discrimination
randomized experiment

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Behaghel, Luc
Crépon, Bruno
Le Barbanchon, Thomas
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2014

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Behaghel, Luc
  • Crépon, Bruno
  • Le Barbanchon, Thomas
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Time of origin

  • 2014

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