Unintended Effects of Anonymous Resumes

Arbeitspapier

We evaluate an experimental program in which the French public employment service anonymized resumes for firms that were hiring. Firms were free to participate or not; participating firms were then randomly assigned to receive either anonymous resumes or name-bearing ones. We find that participating firms become less likely to interview and hire minority candidates when receiving anonymous resumes. We show how these unexpected results can be explained by the self-selection of firms into the program and by the fact that anonymization prevents the attenuation of negative signals when the candidate belongs to a minority.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 8517

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Labor Discrimination ; Labor Discrimination: Public Policy
• Subject: anonymous applications ; discrimination ; randomized experiment

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Behaghel, Luc ; Crépon, Bruno ; Le Barbanchon, Thomas
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2014

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/103483
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET