Arbeitspapier

Unintended Effects of Anonymous Resumes

We evaluate an experimental program in which the French public employment service anonymized resumes for firms that were hiring. Firms were free to participate or not; participating firms were then randomly assigned to receive either anonymous resumes or name-bearing ones. We find that participating firms become less likely to interview and hire minority candidates when receiving anonymous resumes. We show how these unexpected results can be explained by the self-selection of firms into the program and by the fact that anonymization prevents the attenuation of negative signals when the candidate belongs to a minority.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 8517

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Labor Discrimination
Labor Discrimination: Public Policy
Thema
anonymous applications
discrimination
randomized experiment

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Behaghel, Luc
Crépon, Bruno
Le Barbanchon, Thomas
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2014

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Behaghel, Luc
  • Crépon, Bruno
  • Le Barbanchon, Thomas
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2014

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