Arbeitspapier
Can market competition reduce anomalous behaviours
We use an experiment to study whether market competition can reduce anomalous behaviour in games. In different treatments, we employ two alternative mechanisms, the random mechanism and the auction mechanism, to allocate the participation rights to the red hat puzzle game, a well-known logical reasoning problem. Compared to the random mechanism, the auction mechanism significantly reduces deviations from the equilibrium play in the red hat puzzle game. Our findings show that under careful conditions, market competition can indeed reduce anomalous behaviour in games.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: FAU Discussion Papers in Economics ; No. 08/2019
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Design of Experiments: General
Auctions
- Thema
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market competition
market selection hypothesis
auctions
bounded-rationality
red hat puzzle
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Choo, Lawrence
Zhou, Xiaoyu
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Institute for Economics
- (wo)
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Nürnberg
- (wann)
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2019
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Choo, Lawrence
- Zhou, Xiaoyu
- Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Institute for Economics
Entstanden
- 2019