Export credit guarantees, moral hazard and exports quality

Arbeitspapier

We analyse the role played by Export Credit Guarantees (ECGs) to encourage exports to developing countries. The existence of moral hazard on the side of the firm is introduced. We show that the inability of the exporter's government to verify the actual quality of the product will limit its ability to encourage trade through ECGs, once the coverage provided goes beyond a certain threshold. This result provides a rationale behind the limited coverage on ECGs.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Department of Economics Discussion Paper ; No. 04,02

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates ; National Security and War ; Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
• Thema: export credit guarantees ; offsets ; moral hazard ; Exportgarantie ; Exportkreditversicherung ; Produktqualität ; Moral Hazard ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): García-Alonso, María del Carmen ; Levine, Paul ; Morga, Antonia
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Kent, Department of Economics
• (wo): Canterbury
• (wann): 2004

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/68079
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ