Mistrust and Misinformation: A Two-Component, Socio-Epistemic Model of Belief in Conspiracy Theories
Abstract: Although conspiracy theories are endorsed by about half the population and occasionally turn out to be true, they are more typically false beliefs that, by definition, have a paranoid theme. Consequently, psychological research to date has focused on determining whether there are traits that account for belief in conspiracy theories (BCT) within a deficit model. Alternatively, a two-component, socio-epistemic model of BCT is proposed that seeks to account for the ubiquity of conspiracy theories, their variance along a continuum, and the inconsistency of research findings likening them to psychopathology. Within this model, epistemic mistrust is the core component underlying conspiracist ideation that manifests as the rejection of authoritative information, focuses the specificity of conspiracy theory beliefs, and can sometimes be understood as a sociocultural response to breaches of trust, inequities of power, and existing racial prejudices. Once voices of authority are negated due.... https://jspp.psychopen.eu/index.php/jspp/article/view/5273
- Location
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Extent
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Online-Ressource
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Mistrust and Misinformation: A Two-Component, Socio-Epistemic Model of Belief in Conspiracy Theories ; volume:8 ; number:2 ; day:12 ; month:10 ; year:2020
Journal of social and political psychology ; 8, Heft 2 (12.10.2020)
- Creator
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Pierre, Joseph M.
- DOI
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10.5964/jspp.v8i2.1362
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:101:1-2021032004234396707122
- Rights
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Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
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15.08.2025, 7:37 AM CEST
Data provider
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Associated
- Pierre, Joseph M.
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