Arbeitspapier
The Impact of Naïve Advice and Observational Learning in Beauty-contest Games
We study the impact of advice or observation on the depth of reasoning in an experimental beauty-contest game. Both sources of information trigger faster convergence to the equilibrium. Yet, we find that subjects who receive naïve advice outperform uninformed subjects permanently, whereas subjects who observe others’ past behavior before making their decision do only have a temporary advantage over uninformed subjects. We show in a simulation that the latter result is due to subjects failing to make the most out of observing others.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 07-015/1
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
- Thema
-
social learning
advice
observational learning
beauty-contest game
Lernprozess
Wettbewerb
Soziales Verhalten
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Spieltheorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kocher, Martin G.
Sutter, Matthias
Wakolbinger, Florian
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2007
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kocher, Martin G.
- Sutter, Matthias
- Wakolbinger, Florian
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2007