Arbeitspapier

Price undertakings, VERs, and foreign direct investment: The case of foreign rivalry

Antidumping (AD) petitions are often withdrawn in favor of VERs and price undertakings. We compare foreign firms' incentive to engage in foreign direct investment (FDI) under a VER and a price undertaking, with special emphasis on foreign rivalry. We show that a VER is less likely to induce FDI than a price undertaking or AD. Thus, the importing country can increase the level of protection by replacing an AD duty with a VER. This may account for the GATT ban on VERs, given the proliferation of AD cases during the 1990s.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 693

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
FDI
price undertakings
antidumping
VER
WTO
Auslandsinvestition
Antidumping
Exportbeschränkung
WTO-Recht
Internationale Geschäftsbeziehungen
Außenwirtschaftstheorie
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Ishikawa, Jota
Miyagiwa, Kaz
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
(where)
Osaka
(when)
2007

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Ishikawa, Jota
  • Miyagiwa, Kaz
  • Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)

Time of origin

  • 2007

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