Arbeitspapier
Price undertakings, VERs, and foreign direct investment: The case of foreign rivalry
Antidumping (AD) petitions are often withdrawn in favor of VERs and price undertakings. We compare foreign firms' incentive to engage in foreign direct investment (FDI) under a VER and a price undertaking, with special emphasis on foreign rivalry. We show that a VER is less likely to induce FDI than a price undertaking or AD. Thus, the importing country can increase the level of protection by replacing an AD duty with a VER. This may account for the GATT ban on VERs, given the proliferation of AD cases during the 1990s.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 693
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
FDI
price undertakings
antidumping
VER
WTO
Auslandsinvestition
Antidumping
Exportbeschränkung
WTO-Recht
Internationale Geschäftsbeziehungen
Außenwirtschaftstheorie
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Ishikawa, Jota
Miyagiwa, Kaz
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
- (wo)
-
Osaka
- (wann)
-
2007
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Ishikawa, Jota
- Miyagiwa, Kaz
- Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Entstanden
- 2007