Arbeitspapier
Monitoring managers: does it matter?
We test under what circumstances boards discipline managers and whether such interventions improve performance. We exploit exogenous variation due to the staggered adoption of corporate governance laws in formerly Communist countries coupled with detailed 'hard' information about the board's performance expectations and 'soft' information about board and CEO actions and the board's beliefs about CEO competence in 473 mostly private-sector companies backed by private equity funds between 1993 and 2008. We find that CEOs are fired when the company underperforms relative to the board's expectations, suggesting that boards use performance to update their beliefs. CEOs are especially likely to be fired when evidence has mounted that they are incompetent and when board power has increased following corporate governance reforms. In contrast, CEOs are not fired when performance deteriorates due to factors deemed explicitly to be beyond their control, nor are they fired for making 'honest mistakes.' Following forced CEO turnover, companies see performance improvements and their investors are considerably more likely to eventually sell them at a profit.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 2010,30
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage; Ratings and Ratings Agencies
Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
Business and Securities Law
Economic Development: Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies: Planning, Coordination, and Reform
- Subject
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Corporate Governance
Large Shareholders
Boards of Directors
CEO Turnover
Legal Reforms
Transition Economies
Private Equity
Corporate Governance
Führungskräfte
Investmentfonds
Private Equity
Transformationsstaaten
Ostmitteleuropa
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Cornelli, Francesca
Kominek, Zbigniew
Ljungqvist, Alexander
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (where)
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Milano
- (when)
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2010
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Cornelli, Francesca
- Kominek, Zbigniew
- Ljungqvist, Alexander
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Time of origin
- 2010