Arbeitspapier

Monitoring managers: does it matter?

We test under what circumstances boards discipline managers and whether such interventions improve performance. We exploit exogenous variation due to the staggered adoption of corporate governance laws in formerly Communist countries coupled with detailed 'hard' information about the board's performance expectations and 'soft' information about board and CEO actions and the board's beliefs about CEO competence in 473 mostly private-sector companies backed by private equity funds between 1993 and 2008. We find that CEOs are fired when the company underperforms relative to the board's expectations, suggesting that boards use performance to update their beliefs. CEOs are especially likely to be fired when evidence has mounted that they are incompetent and when board power has increased following corporate governance reforms. In contrast, CEOs are not fired when performance deteriorates due to factors deemed explicitly to be beyond their control, nor are they fired for making 'honest mistakes.' Following forced CEO turnover, companies see performance improvements and their investors are considerably more likely to eventually sell them at a profit.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 2010,30

Classification
Wirtschaft
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage; Ratings and Ratings Agencies
Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
Business and Securities Law
Economic Development: Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies: Planning, Coordination, and Reform
Subject
Corporate Governance
Large Shareholders
Boards of Directors
CEO Turnover
Legal Reforms
Transition Economies
Private Equity
Corporate Governance
Führungskräfte
Investmentfonds
Private Equity
Transformationsstaaten
Ostmitteleuropa

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Cornelli, Francesca
Kominek, Zbigniew
Ljungqvist, Alexander
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(where)
Milano
(when)
2010

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Cornelli, Francesca
  • Kominek, Zbigniew
  • Ljungqvist, Alexander
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Time of origin

  • 2010

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