Arbeitspapier

Responsibility-Shifting through Delegation: Evidence from China's One-Child Policy

We provide evidence on how responsibility-shifting through delegation occurred in China's implementation of the one-child policy. We show that trust in local governments was reduced when they were the primary enforcer of the policy (1979–1990), while trust in neighbors was reduced when civilians were incentivized to report neighbors' violations of the policy to the authorities (1991–2015). This effect was more pronounced among parents of a firstborn daughter, who were more likely to violate the policy due to the deep-rooted son preference. This study provides the first set of field evidence on the responsibility-shifting effect of delegation.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 400

Classification
Wirtschaft
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Microeconomic Policy: Formulation, Implementation, and Evaluation
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: General‡
Demographic Economics: Public Policy
Subject
delegation
responsibility-shifting
One-Child policy

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Liu, Yiming
Han, Yi
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
(where)
München und Berlin
(when)
2023

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Liu, Yiming
  • Han, Yi
  • Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition

Time of origin

  • 2023

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