Arbeitspapier

How Universal is Behavior?

This paper studies behavior in experiments with a linear voluntary contributions mechanism for public goods conducted in Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and the USA. The same experimental design was used in the four countries. Our 'contribution function' design allows us to obtain a view of subjects' behavior from two complementary points of view. It yields information about situations where, in purely pecuniary terms, it is a dominant strategy to contribute all the endowment and about situations where it is a dominant strategy to contribute nothing. Our results show, first, that differences in behavior across countries are minor. We find that when people play the same game they behave similarly. Second, for all four countries our data are inconsistent with the explanation that subjects contribute only out of confusion. A common cooperative motivation is needed to explain the data.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 02-100/1

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: General
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Thema
experimental economics
cooperation
public goods games.
Kooperation
Öffentliche Güter
Test
Verhaltensökonomik
Theorie
Verhalten

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Brandts, Jordi
Saijo, Tatsuyoshi
Schram, Arthur
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Tinbergen Institute
(wo)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(wann)
2002

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
2025-03-10T11:42:31+0100

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Brandts, Jordi
  • Saijo, Tatsuyoshi
  • Schram, Arthur
  • Tinbergen Institute

Entstanden

  • 2002

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