Taxes and the location of production

Arbeitspapier

In this paper I examine dynamic tax competition in the context of an endogenous market structure. I therefore consider the tensions between proximity versus concentration, taxation and firm mobility while I also consider strategic interaction by governments (to induce multinationality) and asymmetric firms (for market share). The paper explores how strategic tax setting by rival governments may induce footloose firms to remain committed to initial location decisions, even when faced with adverse taxation regimes. In this instance, sunk costs resulting from the operation of additional plants may confer a first mover advantage on governments that can prevent relocation of firms.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series ; No. WP03/12

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft
• Subject: Steuerwettbewerb ; Betriebliche Standortwahl ; Unvollkommener Wettbewerb ; Theorie ; Wiederholte Spiele

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Porter, Lynda
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University College Dublin, Department of Economics
• (where): Dublin
• (when): 2003

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/72409
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET