Enabling reciprocity through blockchain design

Arbeitspapier

We introduce a reciprocity protocol, an innovative approach to coordinating and sharing rewards in blockchains. Inherently decentralized and easy to implement, it puts emphasis on incentives rather than forcing specific sharing rules from the outset. Analyzing the non-cooperative game the protocol induces, we identify a robust, strict, and Pareto-dominant symmetric equilibrium. In it, even self-centered participants show extensive reciprocity to one another. Thus, despite a setting that is generally unfavorable to reciprocal behavior, the protocol manages to build trust between the users by taking on a role akin to a social contract.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IFRO Working Paper ; No. 2020/14

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium ; Noncooperative Games ; Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact ; Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡
• Thema: Blockchain ; reciprocity ; protocol design ; Nash equilibrium

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Gudmundsson, Jens ; Hougaard, Jens Leth
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics (IFRO)
• (wo): Copenhagen
• (wann): 2020

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/227737
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ