Arbeitspapier
Information Nudges and Self-Control
We study the optimal design of information nudges for present-biased consumers who have to make sequential consumption decisions without exact prior knowledge of their long-term consequences. For arbitrary distributions of risk, there exists a consumer-optimal information nudge that is of cutoff type, recommending consumption or abstinence according to the magnitude of the risk. Under a stronger bias for the present, the target group receiving a credible signal to abstain must be tightened. We compare this nudge with those favored by a health authority or a lobbyist. When some consumers are more strongly present-biased than others, a traffic-light nudge is optimal.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7346
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Subject
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information design
information nudges
present-biased preferences
self-control
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Mariotti, Thomas
Schweizer, Nikolaus
Szech, Nora
von Wangenheim, Jonas
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
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2018
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Mariotti, Thomas
- Schweizer, Nikolaus
- Szech, Nora
- von Wangenheim, Jonas
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2018