Arbeitspapier

Information Nudges and Self-Control

We study the optimal design of information nudges for present-biased consumers who have to make sequential consumption decisions without exact prior knowledge of their long-term consequences. For arbitrary distributions of risk, there exists a consumer-optimal information nudge that is of cutoff type, recommending consumption or abstinence according to the magnitude of the risk. Under a stronger bias for the present, the target group receiving a credible signal to abstain must be tightened. We compare this nudge with those favored by a health authority or a lobbyist. When some consumers are more strongly present-biased than others, a traffic-light nudge is optimal.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7346

Classification
Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Subject
information design
information nudges
present-biased preferences
self-control

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Mariotti, Thomas
Schweizer, Nikolaus
Szech, Nora
von Wangenheim, Jonas
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2018

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Mariotti, Thomas
  • Schweizer, Nikolaus
  • Szech, Nora
  • von Wangenheim, Jonas
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2018

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