Arbeitspapier

Information Nudges and Self-Control

We study the optimal design of information nudges for present-biased consumers who have to make sequential consumption decisions without exact prior knowledge of their long-term consequences. For arbitrary distributions of risk, there exists a consumer-optimal information nudge that is of cutoff type, recommending consumption or abstinence according to the magnitude of the risk. Under a stronger bias for the present, the target group receiving a credible signal to abstain must be tightened. We compare this nudge with those favored by a health authority or a lobbyist. When some consumers are more strongly present-biased than others, a traffic-light nudge is optimal.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7346

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Thema
information design
information nudges
present-biased preferences
self-control

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Mariotti, Thomas
Schweizer, Nikolaus
Szech, Nora
von Wangenheim, Jonas
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2018

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Mariotti, Thomas
  • Schweizer, Nikolaus
  • Szech, Nora
  • von Wangenheim, Jonas
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2018

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