Arbeitspapier

Market power and forward prices

We construct a model of strategic behavior in sequential markets which exhibits a persistent forward price premium. On the spot market, producers wield market power while purchasers are price takers. Producers with forward commitments have less incentive to raise prices on the spot market. Purchasers are thus willing to pay a premium to producers for forward contracts. We argue that this type of forward premium is not susceptible to arbitrage by speculators on the forward market, since purchasers prefer forward contracts backed by producers.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IFN Working Paper ; No. 1193

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Contingent Pricing; Futures Pricing; option pricing
Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Energy: Demand and Supply; Prices
Thema
Forward pricing
Electricity markets
Market power
Arbitrage

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Ruddell, Keith
Downward, Tony
Philpott, Andy
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
(wo)
Stockholm
(wann)
2017

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Ruddell, Keith
  • Downward, Tony
  • Philpott, Andy
  • Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

Entstanden

  • 2017

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