Arbeitspapier
Market power and forward prices
We construct a model of strategic behavior in sequential markets which exhibits a persistent forward price premium. On the spot market, producers wield market power while purchasers are price takers. Producers with forward commitments have less incentive to raise prices on the spot market. Purchasers are thus willing to pay a premium to producers for forward contracts. We argue that this type of forward premium is not susceptible to arbitrage by speculators on the forward market, since purchasers prefer forward contracts backed by producers.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IFN Working Paper ; No. 1193
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Contingent Pricing; Futures Pricing; option pricing
Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Energy: Demand and Supply; Prices
- Thema
-
Forward pricing
Electricity markets
Market power
Arbitrage
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Ruddell, Keith
Downward, Tony
Philpott, Andy
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
- (wo)
-
Stockholm
- (wann)
-
2017
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Ruddell, Keith
- Downward, Tony
- Philpott, Andy
- Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
Entstanden
- 2017