Arbeitspapier
Testing the framework of other-regarding preferences
We assess the empirical validity of the overall theoretical framework of other-regarding preferences by focusing on those preference axioms that are common to all the prominent theories of outcome-based other-regarding preferences. This common set of preference axioms leads to a testable implication: the strict preference ranking of self over a finite number of alternatives lying on any straight line in the space of material payoffs to self and other will be single-peaked. The extent of single-peakedness varies from a high of 79% to a low of 54% across our treatments that are based on dictator and trust games. Positively and/or negatively other-regarding subjects are significantly less likely to report single-peaked rankings relative to self-regarding subjects. We delineate the potential reasons for violations of single-peakedness and discuss the implications of our findings for theoretical modeling of other-regarding preferences.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2011,041
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- Thema
-
other-regarding preferences
social preferences
decision making under risk
single-peaked preferences
experiments
Präferenztheorie
Austauschtheorie (Soziologie)
Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion
Entscheidung bei Unsicherheit
Test
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Levati, M. Vittoria
Nicholas, Aaron
Rai, Birendra
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
- (wo)
-
Jena
- (wann)
-
2011
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Levati, M. Vittoria
- Nicholas, Aaron
- Rai, Birendra
- Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
Entstanden
- 2011