Arbeitspapier

Testing the framework of other-regarding preferences

We assess the empirical validity of the overall theoretical framework of other-regarding preferences by focusing on those preference axioms that are common to all the prominent theories of outcome-based other-regarding preferences. This common set of preference axioms leads to a testable implication: the strict preference ranking of self over a finite number of alternatives lying on any straight line in the space of material payoffs to self and other will be single-peaked. The extent of single-peakedness varies from a high of 79% to a low of 54% across our treatments that are based on dictator and trust games. Positively and/or negatively other-regarding subjects are significantly less likely to report single-peaked rankings relative to self-regarding subjects. We delineate the potential reasons for violations of single-peakedness and discuss the implications of our findings for theoretical modeling of other-regarding preferences.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2011,041

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Thema
other-regarding preferences
social preferences
decision making under risk
single-peaked preferences
experiments
Präferenztheorie
Austauschtheorie (Soziologie)
Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion
Entscheidung bei Unsicherheit
Test

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Levati, M. Vittoria
Nicholas, Aaron
Rai, Birendra
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
(wo)
Jena
(wann)
2011

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Levati, M. Vittoria
  • Nicholas, Aaron
  • Rai, Birendra
  • Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2011

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