Arbeitspapier

Switching costs in retroactive rebates: what’s time got to do with it?

This paper analyzes the role of the reference period in assessing switching costs in retroactive rebates. A retroactive rebate allows a firm to use the inelastic portion of demand as leverage to decrease price in the elastic portion of demand, thereby artificially increasing switching costs of buyers. I identify two factors that determine the extent to which retroactive rebates, as a form of infra-personal price-discrimination, can result in potential market foreclosure. These two factors are the rebate percentage and the threshold at which this percentage is retroactively applied. In contrast to the existing literature, the length of the reference period within which a rebate scheme applies is demonstrated to be at best an indirect approximation of the potential foreclosure effects of a rebate.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2005,3

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
Antitrust Law
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Thema
Retroactive rebates
article 82 ECT
reference period
infra- personal price discrimination
foreclosure

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Maier-Rigaud, Frank P.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2005

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Maier-Rigaud, Frank P.
  • Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Entstanden

  • 2005

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