Arbeitspapier

Fake News

In the last decade, social media and the Internet have amplified the possibility to spread false information, a.k.a. fake news, which has become a serious threat to the credibility of politicians, organizations, and other decision makers. This paper proposes a framework for investigating the incentives to strategically spread fake news under different institutional configurations and payoff structures. In particular, we show under what conditions institutions that foster transparency in the media cause more fake news. Complementary, we study what kind of environments are particularly susceptible to the production of fake news.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 11207

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Thema
campaigning
electoral competition
signal jamming
vertical product differentiation

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Grunewald, Andreas
Kräkel, Matthias
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2017

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Grunewald, Andreas
  • Kräkel, Matthias
  • Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2017

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