Migration and the welfare state: Dynamic political-economy theory

Arbeitspapier

We model an overlapping-generations economy with two skill levels: skilled and unskilled. The welfare-state is modeled simply by a proportional tax on labor income to finance a demogrant in a balanced-budget manner. Therefore, some (the unskilled workers and old retirees) are net beneficiaries from the welfare state and others (the skilled workers) are net contributors to it. Migration policies are set to determine the total migration volume and its skill composition.We characterize subgame-perfect Markov political-economic equilibria consisting of the tax rate (which determines the demogrant), skill composition and the total number of migrants. We distinguish between two voting behaviors: sincere and strategic voting.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2991

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Public Economics: General ; International Factor Movements and International Business: General ; Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
• Thema: Migrationspolitik ; Einwanderungsrecht ; Qualifikation ; Sozialversicherungsfinanzierung ; Umlageverfahren ; Einwanderung ; Wahlverhalten ; Sozialstaat ; Public Choice ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Razîn, Assaf ; Sadka, Efraim ; Suwankiri, Benjarong
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2010

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/38905
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ