Wage formation and monetary policy rules

Arbeitspapier

This paper characterizes the wage setting behavior in a totally unionized economy under different monetary policy rules. The wage formation strategy of the union can be either aggressive or cooperative.. As long as the union is fully cooperative and in the absence of shocks, the government can completely reach its macroeconomic targets: full employment and price stability. If, however, the union becomes aggressive, a constant money supply rule has a nominal wage inflation bias under certain plausible- assumptions. By changing the rules of the game, e.g. following a nominal GNP or price level (inflation) rule, wage demands would be lower and the economy better off.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Year: 1992 ; Kiel: Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW)

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft
• Subject: Lohn ; Geldpolitik ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Funke, Norbert
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Kiel Institute of World Economics (IfW) ; ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
• (where): Kiel
• (when): 1992

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/47048
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET