Arbeitspapier

Risk and Cooperation: Experimental Evidence from Stochastic Public Good Games

Outcomes in social dilemmas often have a stochastic component. We report experimental findings from public good games with both correlated and independent risk across players. We find that the presence of both types of risk prevents the decay of cooperation typically observed in the standard deterministic public good game. The results further suggest that it is greater relative importance of social norms or warm glow giving, rather than risk sharing opportunities that foster cooperation in our stochastic public good game.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2017:3

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
Public Goods
Thema
risk pooling
risk sharing
social norms
linear public goods game
cooperation decay
stable cooperation

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Vesely, Stepan
Wengström, Erik
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
(wo)
Lund
(wann)
2017

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Vesely, Stepan
  • Wengström, Erik
  • Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2017

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