Political Rents in a Non-Corrupt Democracy

Arbeitspapier

A fundamental problem in all political systems is that the people in power may extract rents to the detriment of the general public. In a democracy, electoral competition and information provided by the media may keep such rent extraction at bay. We develop a simple model where rents are decreasing in the degree of political competition and voter information. In line with our theoretical predictions, we find that both increased political competition and increased local media coverage substantially reduce direct measures of legal political rents among local governments in a non-corrupt democracy (Sweden).

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IFN Working Paper ; No. 698

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Structure and Scope of Government: General ; State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: General
• Thema: Accountability ; Political Competition ; Media ; Political Rents ; Politisches System ; Demokratie ; Macht ; Rent-Seeking ; Medienrecht ; Schweden

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Svaleryd, Helena ; Vlachos, Jonas
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
• (wo): Stockholm
• (wann): 2007

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/81144
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ