Arbeitspapier

Administrative overspending in Indonesian districts: The role of local politics

We analyze the determinants of the excessive administrative spending of local governments in Indonesia. In an unbalanced panel data set of 399 districts for 2001-2009, we show that the proliferation of districts has not led to increased administrative spending; instead a lack of political accountability is responsible for this excess. The degree of political competition influences the level of administrative spending significantly; newly introduced direct elections of district heads, however, did not curtail the waste.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Discussion Paper Series ; No. 24

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
State and Local Government: Other Expenditure Categories
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
Finance in Urban and Rural Economies
Thema
administrative expenditures
decentralization
direct elections
Indonesia

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Suharnoko Sjahrir, Bambang
Kis-Katos, Krisztina
Schulze, Günther G.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Freiburg, Department of International Economic Policy (iep)
(wo)
Freiburg i. Br.
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Suharnoko Sjahrir, Bambang
  • Kis-Katos, Krisztina
  • Schulze, Günther G.
  • University of Freiburg, Department of International Economic Policy (iep)

Entstanden

  • 2013

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