Arbeitspapier
Administrative overspending in Indonesian districts: The role of local politics
We analyze the determinants of the excessive administrative spending of local governments in Indonesia. In an unbalanced panel data set of 399 districts for 2001-2009, we show that the proliferation of districts has not led to increased administrative spending; instead a lack of political accountability is responsible for this excess. The degree of political competition influences the level of administrative spending significantly; newly introduced direct elections of district heads, however, did not curtail the waste.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Paper Series ; No. 24
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
State and Local Government: Other Expenditure Categories
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
Finance in Urban and Rural Economies
- Thema
-
administrative expenditures
decentralization
direct elections
Indonesia
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Suharnoko Sjahrir, Bambang
Kis-Katos, Krisztina
Schulze, Günther G.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Freiburg, Department of International Economic Policy (iep)
- (wo)
-
Freiburg i. Br.
- (wann)
-
2013
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Suharnoko Sjahrir, Bambang
- Kis-Katos, Krisztina
- Schulze, Günther G.
- University of Freiburg, Department of International Economic Policy (iep)
Entstanden
- 2013