Konferenzbeitrag
Project Aid or Budget Aid? The Interests of Governments and Financial Institutions
The paper compares different aid policy instruments and their effect on the target group. Starting from a situation where interest groups compete for the resources of the government, international financial institutions aim to change the policy outcome. They can either directly support one group or condition their financial help to the government on its policy. Apart from a normative analysis which policy is more adequate to help one group, the paper also asks what happens if the IFI is driven by bureaucratic self-interest, and whether this distort policies.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Kiel 2005 ; No. 19
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Foreign Aid
Fiscal and Monetary Policy in Development
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- Thema
-
aid policy
conditionality
international financial institutions
interest groups
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Hefeker, Carsten
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Verein für Socialpolitik, Ausschuss für Entwicklungsländer
- (wo)
-
Hannover
- (wann)
-
2005
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp
- Konferenzbeitrag
Beteiligte
- Hefeker, Carsten
- Verein für Socialpolitik, Ausschuss für Entwicklungsländer
Entstanden
- 2005
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