Artikel
The Independence of the European Central Bank
The ECB is formally independent of instructions from any government. During and after the financial crisis and the acute sovereign debt crisis in the euro area, the ECB has used new instruments and has taken on new tasks and responsibilities. This has led to discussions about the independence of the ECB. Against this background, this paper discusses two questions. First, do the new instruments and tasks imply that the independence of the ECB is under threat? Second, is the use of the instruments and the taking on of the new tasks and responsibilities by an independent institution justified in a democracy or is there a relevant democratic deficit? With respect to these two questions the result of this paper is that especially the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) and the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) have to be judged critically.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Journal: Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital ; ISSN: 2199-1235 ; Volume: 52 ; Year: 2019 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 35-68
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Monetary Systems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System; Payment Systems
Monetary Policy
Central Banks and Their Policies
- Subject
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Central bank independence
Eurosystem
monetary policy
financial crisis
sovereign debt crisis
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Neyer, Ulrike
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Duncker & Humblot
- (where)
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Berlin
- (when)
-
2019
- DOI
-
doi:10.3790/ccm.52.1.35
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Neyer, Ulrike
- Duncker & Humblot
Time of origin
- 2019
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