Artikel

Vaccination games with peer effects in a heterogeneous hospital worker population

We develop a game theoretic model to analyze the Nash equilibrium of vaccine decisions in a hospital population with heterogeneous contacts. We use the model in conjunction with person-to-person contact data within a large university hospital. We simulate, using agent-based models, the probability of infection for various worker types in the data and use these probabilities to identify the Nash equilibrium vaccine choices of hospital workers. The analysis suggests that there may be large differences in vaccination rates among hospital worker groups. We extend the model to include peer effects within the game. The peer effects may create additional equilibria or may further cement existing equilibria depending on parameter values. Further, depending on the magnitude of the peer effects and the costs of infection and vaccination, peer effects may increase or decrease differences in worker group vaccination rates within the hospital.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Administrative Sciences ; ISSN: 2076-3387 ; Volume: 5 ; Year: 2015 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 2-26 ; Basel: MDPI

Klassifikation
Öffentliche Verwaltung
Thema
vaccination game
computational epidemiology
economic epidemiology
social networks

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Tassier, Troy
Polgreen, Philip
Segre, Alberto
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
MDPI
(wo)
Basel
(wann)
2015

DOI
doi:10.3390/admsci5010002
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Tassier, Troy
  • Polgreen, Philip
  • Segre, Alberto
  • MDPI

Entstanden

  • 2015

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