Arbeitspapier
Teams promise but do not deliver
Individuals and two-person teams play a hidden - action trust game with pre - play communication. We replicate previous results for individuals that non-binding promises increase cooperation rates. But this does not extend to teams. Wh ile teams make non-binding promises to cooperate at the same rate as individuals, they consistently renege on those promises. Additional treatments begin to explore the basis for the team outcome, ruling out explanations that team payoff structures drive b ehavior. Analysis of within-team discussions provides insight into the decision-making processes of first and second movers.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2019-207
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- Thema
-
trust game
hidden-action
non-binding communication
teams versus individuals
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Nielsen, Kirby
Bhattacharya, Puja
Kagel, John H.
Sengupta, Arjun
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
- (wo)
-
Berlin
- (wann)
-
2019
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Nielsen, Kirby
- Bhattacharya, Puja
- Kagel, John H.
- Sengupta, Arjun
- Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Entstanden
- 2019