Artikel

Teams do inflict costly third-party punishment as individuals do: Experimental evidence

Initiated by the seminal work of Fehr and Fischbacher (Evolution and Human Behavior (2004)), a large body of research has shown that people often take punitive actions towards norm violators even when they are not directly involved in transactions. This paper shows in an experimental setting that this behavioral finding extends to a situation where a pair of individuals jointly decides how strong a third-party punishment to impose. It also shows that this punishment behavior is robust to the size of social distance within pairs. These results lend useful insight since decisions in our everyday lives and also in courts are often made by teams.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 12 ; Year: 2021 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 1-11 ; Basel: MDPI

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
dilemma
experiment
social norms
team decision making
third-party punishment

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Kamei, Kenju
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
MDPI
(where)
Basel
(when)
2021

DOI
doi:10.3390/g12010022
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Kamei, Kenju
  • MDPI

Time of origin

  • 2021

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