The political economy of natural disaster insurance: Lessons from the failure of a proposed compulsory insurance scheme in Germany

Arbeitspapier

This paper studies the politico-economic reasons for the refusal of a proposed compulsory flood insurance scheme in Germany. It provides the rationale for such scheme and outlines the basic features of a market-orientated design. The main reasons for the political down-turn of this proposal were the (mis)perceived costs of a state guarantee, legal objections against a compulsory insurance, distributional conflicts between the federal government and the German states (Länder) on the implied administrative costs, and the well-known "charity hazard" of ad-hoc disaster relief. The focus on pure market solutions proved to be an ineffective strategy for policy advice in this field.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Diskussionspapier ; No. 2006/10

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft
• Thema: Elementarschadenversicherung ; Versicherungspflicht ; Public Choice ; Deutschland

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Schwarze, Reimund ; Wagner, Gert G.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Technische Universität Berlin, Fakultät Wirtschaft und Management
• (wo): Berlin
• (wann): 2006

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/36445
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ