The determinants of asset stripping: theory and evidence from the transition economies

Arbeitspapier

During the transition from plan to market, managers and politicians succeeded in maintaining control of large parts of the stock of socialist physical capital. Despite the obvious importance of this phenomenon, there have been no efforts to model, measure and investigate this process empirically. This paper tries to fill this gap by putting forward theory and econometric evidence. We argue that asset stripping is driven by the interplay between the firm's potential profitability and its ability to influence law enforcement. Our econometric results, for about 950 firms in five transition economies, provide support for this argument.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 1867

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Governmental Property ; Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law ; Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements ; Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies: Political Economy; Property Rights ; Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions
• Subject: asset stripping ; law enforcement ; corruption ; transition ; Öffentliches Unternehmen ; Privatisierung ; Systemtransformation ; Eigentümerstruktur ; Korruption ; Befragung ; Führungskräfte ; Osteuropa ; Rechtsdurchsetzung

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Campos, Nauro F. ; Giovannoni, Francesco
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2005

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/33514
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET