Arbeitspapier
Dynamical modeling of the demographic Prisoner's Dilemma
Epstein (1998) demonstrates that in the demographic Prisoner's Dilemma game it is possible to sustain cooperation in a repeated game played on a finite grid, where agents are spatially distributed and of fixed strategy type ('cooperate' or 'defect'). We introduce a methodology to formalize the dynamical equations for a population of agents distributed in space and in wealth, which form a system similar to the reaction-diffusion type. We determine conditions for stable zones of sustained cooperation in a one-dimensional version of the model. Defectors are forced out of cooperation zones due to a congestion effect, and accumulate at the boundaries.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Reihe Ökonomie / Economics Series ; No. 124
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
- Thema
-
Prisoner's Dilemma
demographic
active media
reaction-diffusion
Gefangenendilemma
Kooperation
Theorie
Soziale Beziehungen
Evolutionäre Spieltheorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Dorofeenko, Viktor
Shorish, Jamsheed
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS)
- (wo)
-
Vienna
- (wann)
-
2002
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Dorofeenko, Viktor
- Shorish, Jamsheed
- Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS)
Entstanden
- 2002