Arbeitspapier

Dynamical modeling of the demographic Prisoner's Dilemma

Epstein (1998) demonstrates that in the demographic Prisoner's Dilemma game it is possible to sustain cooperation in a repeated game played on a finite grid, where agents are spatially distributed and of fixed strategy type ('cooperate' or 'defect'). We introduce a methodology to formalize the dynamical equations for a population of agents distributed in space and in wealth, which form a system similar to the reaction-diffusion type. We determine conditions for stable zones of sustained cooperation in a one-dimensional version of the model. Defectors are forced out of cooperation zones due to a congestion effect, and accumulate at the boundaries.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Reihe Ökonomie / Economics Series ; No. 124

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Thema
Prisoner's Dilemma
demographic
active media
reaction-diffusion
Gefangenendilemma
Kooperation
Theorie
Soziale Beziehungen
Evolutionäre Spieltheorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Dorofeenko, Viktor
Shorish, Jamsheed
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS)
(wo)
Vienna
(wann)
2002

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Dorofeenko, Viktor
  • Shorish, Jamsheed
  • Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS)

Entstanden

  • 2002

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