Dynamical modeling of the demographic Prisoner's Dilemma

Arbeitspapier

Epstein (1998) demonstrates that in the demographic Prisoner's Dilemma game it is possible to sustain cooperation in a repeated game played on a finite grid, where agents are spatially distributed and of fixed strategy type ('cooperate' or 'defect'). We introduce a methodology to formalize the dynamical equations for a population of agents distributed in space and in wealth, which form a system similar to the reaction-diffusion type. We determine conditions for stable zones of sustained cooperation in a one-dimensional version of the model. Defectors are forced out of cooperation zones due to a congestion effect, and accumulate at the boundaries.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Reihe Ökonomie / Economics Series ; No. 124

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
• Subject: Prisoner's Dilemma ; demographic ; active media ; reaction-diffusion ; Gefangenendilemma ; Kooperation ; Theorie ; Soziale Beziehungen ; Evolutionäre Spieltheorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Dorofeenko, Viktor ; Shorish, Jamsheed
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS)
• (where): Vienna
• (when): 2002

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/71200
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET