Mergers, investment decisions and internal organisation

Arbeitspapier

We analyse the effects of investment decisions and firms’ internal organisation on the efficiency and stability of horizontal mergers. In our framework synergies are endogenous and there might be internal conflict within merged firms. We show that often stable mergers do not lead to more efficiency and may even lead to efficiency losses. These mergers lead to lower welfare, suggesting that a regulator should be careful in assuming that possible efficiency gains of a merger will be effectively realised. Moreover, the paper offers a possible explanation for merger failures.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2004-13

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Firm Organization and Market Structure ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
• Subject: Horizontal Mergers ; Investment ; Efficiency gains ; Internal Conflict

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Banal-Estañol, Albert ; Macho-Stadler, Inés ; Seldeslachts, Jo
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
• (where): Berlin
• (when): 2004

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/50988
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET