Arbeitspapier

Tax decentralization notwithstanding regional disparities

In assessing the desirability for tax decentralization reforms, a dilemma between efficiency and redistribution emerges. By limiting the ability of the central government to redistribute resources towards regions in financial needs, decentralization curbs incentives for excessive subnational spending and enhances fiscal discipline, but may also widen interregional disparities by triggering tax competition for mobile tax bases. We provide a formal treatment of this trade-off, and shed light on the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization. We find that tax decentralization can be optimal even under Rawlsian social preferences which only weight the welfare of the poorest region in the federation.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7607

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
Thema
fiscal federalism
tax competition
regional disparities

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bellofatto, Antonio Andrés
Besfamille, Martin
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2019

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Bellofatto, Antonio Andrés
  • Besfamille, Martin
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2019

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