Arbeitspapier
Social Comparisons in Wage Delegation: Experimental Evidence
This article examines whether social comparisons have behavioral effects on workers' performance when a firm can choose workers' wages or let them choose their own. Firms can delegate the wage decision to neither, one or both workers in the firm. We vary the information workers receive, finding that social comparisons concerning both wages and decision rights affect workers' performance. Moreover, the relative effect of discrimination in relation to decision rights is larger than in relation to wage. We find these treatment effects with both stated effort and a real-effort task, suggesting that both approaches may yield similar results.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 7802
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
- Thema
-
delegation
gift-exchange
experiment
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Charness, Gary
Cobo-Reyes, Ramón
Lacomba, Juan A.
Lagos, Francisco
Pérez, José María
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2013
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Charness, Gary
- Cobo-Reyes, Ramón
- Lacomba, Juan A.
- Lagos, Francisco
- Pérez, José María
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2013