Arbeitspapier

Social Comparisons in Wage Delegation: Experimental Evidence

This article examines whether social comparisons have behavioral effects on workers' performance when a firm can choose workers' wages or let them choose their own. Firms can delegate the wage decision to neither, one or both workers in the firm. We vary the information workers receive, finding that social comparisons concerning both wages and decision rights affect workers' performance. Moreover, the relative effect of discrimination in relation to decision rights is larger than in relation to wage. We find these treatment effects with both stated effort and a real-effort task, suggesting that both approaches may yield similar results.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 7802

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Thema
delegation
gift-exchange
experiment

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Charness, Gary
Cobo-Reyes, Ramón
Lacomba, Juan A.
Lagos, Francisco
Pérez, José María
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Charness, Gary
  • Cobo-Reyes, Ramón
  • Lacomba, Juan A.
  • Lagos, Francisco
  • Pérez, José María
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2013

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