Noisy talk

Artikel

We investigate strategic information transmission with communication error, or noise. Our main finding is that adding noise can improve welfare. With quadratic preferences and a uniform type distribution, welfare can be raised for almost every bias level by introducing a sufficiently small amount of noise. Furthermore, there exists a level of noise that makes it possible to achieve the best payoff that can be obtained by means of any communication device. As in the model without noise, equilibria are interval partitional; with noise, however, coding (the measure of the message space used by each interval of the equilibrium partition of the type space) becomes critically important.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 2 ; Year: 2007 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 395-440 ; New York, NY: The Econometric Society

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
• Subject: Communication ; information transmission ; cheap talk ; noise

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Blume, Andreas ; Board, Oliver J. ; Kawamura, Kohei
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): The Econometric Society
• (where): New York, NY
• (when): 2007

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150102
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET